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Abstract
Th e phenomenon of climate change calls for a response and those who claim to be committed to crea-
ting such a response are known as environmentalists. In social research, much eff ort is spent in search 
for these environmentalists, and in trying to understand why they are found in certain geographical 
and social locations rather than others. One of the dominant views in environmental sociology holds 
environmentalism to be a position of the affl  uent. 
Th is paper delivers a threefold provocation – conceptual, empirical and political – with the aim of 
shifting future research in another direction. Conceptually, it insists on the need to distinguish between 
post-political and political environmentalism, which is exemplifi ed by the social movement called de-
growth. Empirically, it is shown that the research which paints environmentalism as a position of the 
affl  uent relies on a post-political construal of what it means to be an environmentalist. It then shows 
how defi ning environmental value orientations more in lines with those of degrowth gives a very di-
ff erent map of environmentalism in Europe. Politically, this challenges established conceptions of what 
is realistic policy both for this continent and beyond. We conclude with a brief suggestion for the kind 
of politics that might be both politically feasible and capable of articulating an appropriate response 
to the challenge of climate change.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Th at global climate is undergoing transformations as a consequence of human activity is 
all but universally accepted.1 Th e same is true for the notion that humans are reliant on 
the stability of their climate, and that the ensuing transformation poses a serious threat 
to them. Th ose who worry about this fact, and who are willing to take action, belong 
to the group of people called environmentalists. But where can we expect to encounter 
such environmentalists? Which conditions are conducive for cultivating the value orien-
tations which defi ne them? Th e answers we give to these questions are the foundational 
1 See Dunlap and McCright (2011) for a discussion on those who still seek to digress.
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elements of any policy which seeks to respond to the challenge of climate change. One 
strong paradigm within the social sciences provides answers based on the assumption 
that such environmentalism is grounded in post-materialist value orientations, which 
are primarily found among the affl  uent (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Gelissen, 2007; 
Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Nawrotzki, 2012). In this paper we challenge this position, 
both with respect to where it holds that environmentalists are to be found and, more 
fundamentally, what their defi ning characteristics are to begin with.
Th is challenge proceeds on two levels: In section 2 below, we scrutinize the dominant 
understandings of what environmentalism is really about in order to develop a more 
diff erentiated notion of it. We contrast the dominant “post-political” conception of envi-
ronmentalism with “degrowth”-oriented environmentalism, associating the former with 
green consumption and the latter with concerns over distributive justice. Th is discussion 
takes place on the level on which the traits are defi ned, which empirical research then 
maps in its search for environmentalists. We argue that the position we seek to challenge 
stems from a defi nition centred on a willingness to pay for the sake of the environment, 
which is the hidden basis for the results of the so-called affl  uence hypothesis. Our discu-
ssion leads us to consider a very diff erent kind of environmentalism.
In section 3, we employ this diff erentiation in order to revisit the very same empirical 
data that the position we rejected makes recourse to for advancing its claims. Th is data 
indeed testifi es to the importance of affl  uence in Europe – but only to the extent that 
the dominant pre-conceptions of what characterises an “environmentalist” remain unc-
hallenged. With particular focus on the European semi-periphery, we trace a pattern of 
concern with environmental issues that does not correlate with affl  uence. Instead, this 
pattern stands in an intimate relation with issues of inequality and commitments in 
favour of distributive justice, and hence we refer to it as egalitarian environmentalism. 
Once we demonstrate the contours of this egalitarian environmentalism, something si-
gnifi cant will have been achieved: a challenge to the pre-conceptions of the relation that 
the European semi-periphery might take up with environmental politics; a challenge 
to how quantitative research has tended to go about searching for environmentalists; 
as well as a challenge to the conceptions which hold environmentalism to be a position 
of the affl  uent. Th is has political implications, including a strong case against positions 
that hold that the key for cultivating responsiveness to perils such as climate change is 
found in the generation of monetary wealth which would dispose people to pay more 
for ‘greener products’. If our challenge is valid, then another kind of politics is needed.
In section 4, we present a brief proposal as to what the politics might look like which 
would resonate with the kind of environmentalist value orientations we discuss in the 
preceding sections. Th rough such politics, a path may open ahead which does not rely 
on the growth of that social metabolism which drives climate change.
2. VARIETIES OF ENVIRONMENTALISM
Our purpose in this section is twofold: First, to scrutinize the paradoxes immanent to 
dominant environmentalisms. Doing so prompts the question whether an environmen-
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talism exists which is unbound by such paradox. We then suggest that this is the case for 
the positions which characterise the social movement known as degrowth. Th is discussi-
on will outline the distinction between these environmentalisms, and show us why it is 
important to keep them apart. On the basis of this distinction, we then argue that much 
existing research on the distribution of environmentalists is shaped by a commitment 
to the kind of environmentalism we deem inadequate. By searching for commitments 
connected to the alternative form of environmentalism, a very diff erent map of Europe 
might appear – which has implications also far beyond this continent. We follow up on 
this in the subsequent section.
Th e United Nations document Climate Action Now: Summary for Policymakers 2015 
(United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, 2015) is a good example of what a con-
ventional environmentalist policy response to climate change looks like. It proposes 
a shift towards renewable energy, energy effi  ciency, low-carbon transport and carbon 
capture, but does not touch upon the fundamentals of contemporary capitalist civili-
sation. Th is UN proposal is typical of the dominant framing of climate change, which 
has been argued to move rapidly from problem to diagnosis to cure, obviating any space 
of deliberation on what a truly appropriate response may look like (Szerszynski, 2010). 
In relying on expertise coupled with an avoidance of distributional and other confl icts, 
it epitomises a post-political framing wherein humanity is construed as a unifi ed whole 
standing on the brink of imminent demise occasioned by an external force (Swynge-
douw, 2010:217-221). Th is serves to blot out antagonisms, and inscribes our responses 
to climate change into a system of universalised administration that makes it (and us) 
subject to a purely managerial logic (Swyngedouw, 2010:225).
Would such eff orts be enough? Many would disagree. For instance, the New Economics 
Foundation (Simms et al., 2010:66) models a scenario that incorporates all currently 
proposed policy proposals on energy use and carbon emissions, and the fi ndings suggest 
that it would be near impossible to reach the emission goals posited by institutions 
such as the UN while maintaining present economic growth. Still, despite how the evi-
dence of the trade-off  between sustainability and economic growth is growing, in high 
level policy proposals like the UN Summary for Policymakers the reliance on economic 
growth remains unchallenged.
Th e claim that climate change is necessarily a so thoroughly post-political topic is 
challenged by John Urry (2011:91) who argues that such claims simply ignore the plet-
hora of actual politicised responses to this issue. One such response, in the context of 
a response to the global environmental situation as such, is found within the social 
movement known as degrowth. Challenging the belief in the necessity, possibility and 
desirability of economic growth, this originally southern European movement is rapidly 
spreading across the continent and beyond (Demaria, et al. 2013; Muraca, 2013).
Degrowth today marks both a social movement and a conceptual framework within 
which to repoliticise the discussion of desirable development (Kallis et al., 2015). Con-
ventional discussions of “development”, it is argued, are oversaturated with economism, 
meaning a focus on the calculated economic outcome of every strategy or normative 
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societal orientation (Martinez-Alier, 2015). Such economism overshadows the vulnera-
bility of nature, aims for permanence, mutual aid and care, as well as creativity and the 
revolutionary potential of grassroots communities. As a result, the current dominant 
development model (criticized by this movement) holds improvements to well-being 
to be predicated on the growth of material consumption even for societies with a very 
high level of human development as measured by UNDP. In response, the degrowth 
social movement and theory attempt to reinterpret the fundamentally unsustainable 
condition of contemporary global society (Schaff artzik et al., 2014).
As a movement and a theory, degrowth deliberately plays on the shock value of challen-
ging the secular dogma of economic growth. It serves as a missile concept in order 
to open up a conversation about what can and should be provided for humans and 
ecosystems alike. It ties in with the environmental justice movement in emphasising 
the interconnection of society, nature and the economy, and emphasises issues beyond a 
mere reduction of material fl ows. What remains must be distributed more equally, with 
greater popular control over production processes, bringing urban and rural spaces to 
a more equal footing (Anguelovski, 2015). Having said that, degrowth does not as yet 
provide an alternative paradigm with model problems and solutions for the scientifi c 
community, nor does it provide straightforward universal research instruments in the 
social sciences. Th erefore, below we piece together loose strands from a piecemeal map-
ping of country potentials based on selected data sources.
Th e ecological stream of degrowth thinking stresses the current competition and future 
strategic trade-off  between ecosystems and the industrial production and consumpti-
on systems. Th e democratic stream of degrowth champions debate and popular enga-
gement over defi nitions of development and progress, and over struggles for justice, 
redistribution and technological intervention into social metabolisms. Motivated by 
these priorities of the degrowth movement, the environmentalism we are interested in 
exploring might be called “environmentally motivated democratic degrowth” (Domazet 
and Ančić, 2017), or a “growth-critical environmentalism”. Such environmentalism, 
concerned fundamentally with social justice, rejects the post-political response to clima-
te change that frames it as a problem that can be solved by relying on (techno-scientifi c) 
expertise (Swyngedouw, 2010).
Th ese are the two kinds of environmentalism our discussion in this paper focuses on. If 
we turn to existing social research on the distribution of environmentalist value orien-
tations, it will now be clear that much of this research implicitly understands envi-
ronmentalism in the post-political terms set out above. For example, what is centrally 
important for Franzen and Meyer (2010)2 in their search for environmentalists are que-
stions about a person’s willingness to pay higher prices and taxes in order to protect the 
environment; to accept cuts in his / her standard of living, and to act in favour of the 
environment also when doing so costs more money and time. Th is research implies that 
2 Th is research is the most solid engagement from this angle with the same dataset that we discuss in sec-
tion 3 below.
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concerned citizens are to be found where money is, and that environmentalism arrives 
in the wake of affl  uence (Diekmann and Franzen, 1999; Kemmelmeier et al., 2002; 
Meyer and Liebe, 2010; Franzen and Vogl, 2013). If “willingness to pay” is what defi nes 
an environmentalist, then it is perhaps not surprising that they are found among those 
already in possession of ample resources to pay with. In section 3, we begin an explora-
tion of what the distribution of environmentalist value orientations may look like if we 
de-emphasise this kind of action. Here we seek to show that such results (those of e.g. 
Franzen and Meyer, 2010) do not show any viable path for generating popular support 
for the measures necessary for sustainability. Indeed, if the environmentalist as consumer 
profi le is ultimately valid, we are stuck in an irresolvable paradox. Demonstrating this, 
we hope, is suffi  cient for motivating renewed scrutiny of such results.
One problem is illuminated when paying attention to the European semi-periphery, 
emphasizing its role as a semi-periphery. Unlike societies classifi ed as “peripheral”, this 
region is characterised by already high material standards of living. At the same time, 
here the concern for the environment appears even lower than what is the case for much 
of the periphery (Domazet and Ančić, 2017). Why is this so? Th e level of affl  uence rele-
vant to how a person will answer the kind of questionnaires on which these conclusions 
are based appear to be contingent upon who they generally compare their position to 
(Domazet and Ančić, 2017:170). When such comparisons take place in terms of posi-
tional goods – goods whose very desirability is defi ned by their scarcity (Hirsch, 2005) 
– then, in a situation of inequity and insofar as affl  uence is the condition of sacrifi ce, no 
degree of economic growth will ever alone be suffi  cient to make the majority of people 
feel affl  uent enough to sacrifi ce for the environment. Th at intra-societal inequalities are 
also crucial for determining a person’s feeling of well-being, and then probably affl  uence 
as well, is already well documented (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). In response to the 
last several decades of rising social inequalities in Europe, both East and West, con-
temporary social science has thematised the paralysing eff ect that inequality has on the 
social fabric of society (Milanovic, 2011; Sandel, 2012; Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 2012; 
Stiglitz, 2013). Driving this point forward, we suggest that this rising inequality is re-
fl ected in people’s unwillingness to sacrifi ce personal consumption for the sake of the 
environment. Given that inequalities have grown faster in the European semi-periphery, 
this might help contextualise the apparently low levels of concern for the environment.
Further, research shows how a 20% increase in the level of “development” is paid for 
by a 50% larger ecological footprint in a cross-national comparison of these European 
countries (Domazet and Marinović Jerolimov, 2014). Already at present there are si-
gnifi cant diff erences in the contributions made to climate change by richer European 
nations and those which are poorer. For instance, European emissions trends seen on 
the comparative data for CO2 emissions from fossil fuels use and cement production 
(EC JRC, 2014) show that in poorer Eastern European countries that participate in the 
2010 ISSP Environment module emissions have been almost halved from their peak 
level, whilst in richer Western European countries they have not even dropped by 20% 
(see Figure 1). Needless to say, they have been signifi cantly lower in per capita volume 
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to start with. With no precedence for major decoupling of environmental loads from 
growth (Bithas and Kalimeris, 2013; Kalimeris et al., 2014), it would appear that ma-
king people care for the environment comes at the price of further destroying it.
Source: European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC) / Netherlands Environmental Asse-
ssment Agency (PBL) (2014).
Figure 1. Change in annual CO2 emissions from 1970 for Western and post-socialist coun-
tries participating in the ISSP 2010 Environment module; with special empha-
sis on the 5 years from the last global economic crisis. 
A third problem, if the affl  uence hypothesis possesses exclusive validity, appears if we 
attend to those affl  uent ones who do claim to be moved by moral concerns in their con-
sumer choices: the well observed gap between such commitments and the propensity 
to actually follow up on them (Auger and Devinney, 2007). As Carrington, Zwick and 
Neville point out, there is a common tendency to treat this gap as a matter of individual 
shortcomings (2016:23). But doing so, the authors argue, fails to take into account the 
diff erence between the context where the questionnaire is answered, and the context 
where the purchase of a commodity is made. Whereas the questionnaire itself calls for 
conscious moral deliberation, such considerations are structurally excluded from the 
domain where consumer choices are made. Not only are moral deliberations not expe-
cted in this context, but market-actors are expected not to act on such concerns. Th us, 
the authors argue, the existence of the gap merely demonstrates that capitalism works 
as it is supposed to (Carrington et al., 2016:29). If things work as they are supposed to 
within a system predicated on a surplus of desire over productive output at any given 
time, then economic growth (which would need to be challenged in order to formulate 
an adequate response to climate change) remains the foundation of economic activity. 
Instead of being a legitimate concern, worry over “the gap” is itself part of an ideology 
that re-inscribes our worries into politics-as-usual. By presenting the consumer as a so-
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vereign in possession of the power to change the world through their consumer choices, 
growth-centred capitalism is made to appear salvageable if only these sovereigns can 
bring themselves to close the gap between their sentiments and their actions (C arrin-
gton et al., 2016:31). Th us, the option of translating those sentiments into more radical 
action is foreclosed (Carrington et al., 2016:24).
In light of the above, research which profi les environmentalists in these conventional 
terms is unlikely to fi nd either conditions that can be cultivated so to generate the su-
bjectivities it fi nds, nor will it fi nd those poised towards adequate response to climate 
change in the fi rst place. How signifi cant is the apparent lack of such environmentalists 
in the European semi-periphery then really? Perhaps, instead, we ought to renew the 
terms that structure the scope of our search. One starting point for doing so is the classic 
work by Martinez-Alier (2002), which proposes a threefold division of environmenta-
lism-s: the cult of wilderness, the gospel of eco-effi  ciency, and the environmentalism of 
the poor. Th e fi rst environmentalism is concerned with untouched nature, the second 
includes environmental impacts of productive processes, and the third is characterised 
by a concern with inter-human justice (Martinez-Alier, 2002:1-11).
Like Martinez-Alier, it is the latter that we wish to expound upon, when we now attempt 
to orientate ourselves towards the value orientations we would associate with degrowth-en-
vironmentalism. Beyond those who are explicitly dedicated to such an environmentalism, 
the commitments we associate with it are such we would expect among marginalised 
groups rather than the affl  uent. Perhaps contributing to their absence from the sort of 
research we criticise in this paper, these concerns are often voiced by people who are facing 
concrete impacts at extractive frontiers, but who do not necessarily think of themselves as 
“environmentalists” (Martinez-Alier, 2002:11). Th ere is no shortage of confl icts occasio-
ned by such processes in the European semi-periphery (Temper, 2015; EJatlas, 2016). If 
we were to call these people “environmentalists” regardless, and decide to investigate their 
distribution within Europe, what characteristics should we look for? Instead of searching 
for those that profess a willingness to pay for a clean environment, we would search for 
concerns over distributive economic justice, for worries over the eff ects of relentless econo-
mic growth, and for those experiencing the present environmental situation as posing risks.
We have now diff erentiated two kinds of environmentalism, and shown how much 
existing research maps but one of these. Arguing that this environmentalism is insuffi  -
cient for meeting the demands posed by climate change and related issues, we hope that 
the need for attending to environmentalism of the second kind has been made clear. 
In the following section, we synthesize emerging research on this issue, which indicates 
where such attention may lead.
3. ENVIRONMENTALISM IN EUROPE
Our purpose in this section is to discuss how the existing empirical data which supports 
the affl  uence hypothesis can be re-interpreted in light of the diff erentiation of environ-
mentalisms discussed above. Our polemic joins the body of studies questioning the do-
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minance of the affl  uence hypothesis, not through a novel statistical analysis, but rather 
through deconstruction of the central role aff orded to green consumerism in constructs 
of comparative statistics. We do this through a review of recent studies on the distributi-
on of social attitudes towards environmentalism in Europe, based largely on ISSP3 data 
(ISSP, 2012) and various aggregate country indicators. In doing so, we focus on that 
part of the semi-periphery that is usually referred to as post-socialist Europe. Relying 
on standard comparative survey data means we are confi ned to tracing correlations on 
the level of national averages, which is far from perfect, but this way we get to challenge 
the dominant interpretations at the very foundations that support them. Insofar as the 
national level remains an important avenue for negotiating political responses to climate 
change, this is also an appropriate level for thinking through the potential receptiveness 
of various policies and strategies.
Source: Reprinted from Domazet and Marinović Jerolimov (2014).
Th e 18 countries participating in the ISSP 2010 Environment module (ISSP, 2012) are marked in 
a lighter colour.
Abbreviations: GNI=Gross National Income (almost identical to GDP in the case of Europe); 
HDI=Human Development Index (UNDP).
Figure 2. GNI per capita – HDI (2012) values spread for European countries, excluding 
Lichtenstein.
3 Th e International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is an academic-led and globally coordinated pro-
gramme gathering data for comparative research on diff erent topics. Th e data primarily drawn on here 
comes from the Environment module fi elded in 2010 and 2011. Th is module included 60 questions on 
environmental attitudes and behaviours, and a comprehensive set of background variables; it was fi elded in 
36 countries globally and the national samples are representative of the adult population of each country. 
Th e fi rst version of the dataset that most of the analyses reviewed here relied on was published by the Ger-
man data archive GESIS in 2012 (ISSP, 2012).
Soc. ekol. Zagreb, Vol. 25 (2016.), No. 1-2
O. Krűger, M. Domazet and D. Dolenec: Rejecting the Post-Political Response to Climate Change: ...
175
Even though all nations in Europe are ranked as “high human development” by UNDP’s 
HDI measure, for some of them further economic growth may still bring gains to their 
human development score, as suggested by Figure 2. As Figure 2 illustrates, all national 
HDI scores fall above the global cut-off  point where the increasing GNI (or GDP) 
brings a comparatively lower HDI contribution (this cut-off  point is usually around 
10 000 USD pc and 0.7 HDI value), but the scatter in the graph indicates a possible 
second cut-off  point within Europe. Th is point stands just below 30 000 USD pc, above 
which the rise in HDI is almost negligent. Most European countries, many of them 
represented in the ISSP 2010, are still below this value of GNI pc, and could possibly 
gain further increases in HDI with rising per capita GNI.
As argued in the preceding section, many comparative cross-national analyses applying 
multilevel modelling to the distribution of environmentalism predicated on environ-
mental concern are based on the assumption that such development-through-growth 
holds the key for cultivating the value orientations required for a democratic answer 
to climate change. Th is affl  uence hypothesis rests on the premise that environmental 
health and stability is like a commodity for which the demand rises with the affl  uence 
of individuals, and consequently of whole societies. It also presupposes that the most 
meaningful and widespread action on behalf of the environment is mediated through a 
mechanism of demand and willingness to pay for desirable goods. Th e “environment” 
becomes a good that richer societies will more readily aff ord and seek out (Diekmann 
and Franzen, 1999; Franzen, 2003; Meyer and Liebe, 2010; Franzen and Meyer, 2010). 
Whilst competing interpretations of diff erences in values, concerns, self-reported beha-
viour and cultural practices related to environment exist both in sociology (Fairbrother, 
2012; Knight and Messer, 2012) and in the humanities, the affl  uence hypothesis has a 
particularly strong sway in survey-based comparative analyses (Dunlap, 2017). In such 
studies (Kemmelmeier, et al., 2002; Franzen, 2003; Gelissen, 2007; Marquart-Pyatt, 
2008; Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Nawrotzki, 2012; Franzen and Vogl, 2012; Franzen 
and Vogl, 2013) affl  uence is a strong predictor of national diff erences in environmental 
concern among European nations, which are culturally and developmentally similar 
when viewed from a global perspective (Marquart-Pyatt, 2012a; Ančić and Domazet, 
2015; Schaff rin and Schmidt-Catran, 2017).
Also, the less quantitatively-driven analyses often argue that the attained level of material 
comfort provides diff erent prerequisites in diff erent societies for the sacrifi ces required for 
the transformation of material and social infrastructure (Helm and Simonis, 2001; Bo-
ehmer-Christiansen, 2003; Timmons Roberts and Parks, 2010; Princen, 2010; Wapner, 
2010). When sacrifi ce is theoretically based on a willingness to pay, a specifi c statistical 
weighting of cultural predispositions leads to the confi rmation of the affl  uence hypothesis 
across diff erent cross-national and longitudinal datasets such as the ISSP, WVS4 and EVS5 
(cf. Franzen and Vogl, 2012). Fundamentally, the logic of this conclusion can be glossed 
4 WVS: World Values Survey.
5 EVS: European Values Survey.
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as: “more money, more development, more environmental concern, greater readiness to 
act on global climate change”. Th ough by no means exclusive or solely triumphant, the 
affl  uence hypothesis is of particular signifi cance both because of its ease of translation into 
the economist discourse that has a great infl uence on policy today, and because of the 
economism-minded6 way it is defi ned and measured (Dunlap, 2017).
Source: Reprinted from Domazet et al. (2014). 
Figure 3. Composite indicator of “Material sacrifi ce attitudes”, higher value signifi es more 
prevalent “willingness to pay” within a national population.
6 Economism is a discursive reduction of broad social facts to economic dimensions.
7 In terms of functional analysis of the world-systems theory, not a political value judgement.
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Th e “get richer to get greener” maxim has direct implications for the materially poo-
rer and supposedly less environmentalist populations of the European semi-periphery. 
Whilst their level of development allows them to be readily compared against more 
affl  uent core7 European nations, the ability of their populations to pay for “environ-
ment” as a commodity is objectively lower, supposedly making them politically unable 
to commit to the required material sacrifi ces. Now, does existing data actually support 
any of these assumptions?
On an immediate level, it appears that the answer is “yes”. Our research (Domazet et 
al., 2014; Dolenec et al., 2014; Domazet and Ančić, 2017) confi rms that “willingness 
to pay” for environmental protection is correlated with national income, even when 
we adjust for income inequality at the national level. GDP per capita and associated 
GNI along with inequality-adjusted income index are the strongest predictors of the 
prevalence of such attitudes (Domazet et al., 2014:163-165). As a result, countries of 
the European semi-periphery are mostly at the lower part of Figure 3. On face value we 
might indeed conclude that the populations of the European semi-periphery are simply 
too preoccupied with material development to pay attention and exemplify suffi  cient 
awareness to environmental issues.
Nevertheless, it is precisely when focusing on such things as “paying attention and expre-
ssing awareness” of seriousness of environmental problems, that the already existing data 
suggests something else. As Figure 4 indicates, semi-peripheral (Eastern and Southern 
European) populations that occupy the lower part of the scale in Figure 3 in many cases 
occupy the inverse position when it comes to concern over climate change. In any case, 
in the ISSP dataset reported on before, as well as in the Eurobarometer dataset in Figure 
3, attaching serious concern to climate change is more prevalent among Southern and 
Eastern European countries. 
In our version of the argument, environmental concern is not simply a value orientation, 
but a perception of direct, real environmental threats (Brechin, 1999; Dunlap and York, 
2008). In the literature that focuses on the experience of environmental degradation in 
developing countries, this second variety of concern has been conceptualised as the “en-
vironmentalism of the poor” introduced above (Martinez-Alier, 2002). Dolenec et al. 
(2014) explore this variety of environmentalism, looking for evidence of sustainability 
orientations in less affl  uent European societies. Th ey start from two assumptions: that 
inequality of income and of material life circumstances pose obstacles to sustainability 
orientations in European societies, and that, while wealthier societies exhibit stronger 
environmental concern overall, perceptions of direct environmental risk is stronger in 
the European semi-periphery. Th ese results, as well as those of Brajdić Vuković (2014), 
clearly show that respondents from less affl  uent European countries are more aware of 
environmental risks than respondents from affl  uent ones. Even more importantly, these 
fi ndings support Haanpää’s (2006; on ISSP dataset) and Knight and Messer’s (2012; on 
WVS dataset) arguments according to which poorer populations may have a stronger 
perception of direct, real environmental threats despite not expressing great individual 
activation and commitment to personal material sacrifi ce.
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Source: Amended dataset from Eurobarometer Climate Change (2011). Translated and transposed 
from Ančić et al. (2016). 
Figure 4. Indicator “Climate change as a serious problem” (2011; 2013 in case of Croatia) 
– mean values of the response by EU member country and Croatia. 
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Th us, despite being poorer and “less developed” on average, the European semi-perip-
hery does not stand out as negligent, non-environmentalist or as lacking concern over 
climate change. Also, on a composite indicator which, in addition to climate change, 
measures concerns over pollution, GMOs and nuclear energy, this trend is repeated for 
such comparisons between richer, poorer, core and semi-peripheral European nations 
(Haanpää, 2006; Dolenec et al., 2014; Brajdić Vuković, 2014). Even in Eurobarometer 
surveys conducted on all contemporary European member states, concern over climate 
change as a global problem does not diff er signifi cantly across European regions even 
though it fl uctuates overall and within individual countries (EC, 2008; EC, 2014). 
Beyond concern, beliefs and attitudes, environmental risks – that is, an expectation that 
a particular phenomenon in the physical environment will have negative consequences 
to oneself and society – are experimentally associated with the spur to pro-environmen-
tal behaviour (Brechin, 1999; Marquart-Pyatt, 2012b). Sometimes people will act out 
in order to minimise risks, and not just to stay true to their beliefs and concerns. Ac-
cording to O’Connor et al, (1999:469), risk perceptions are “not a surrogate for general 
environmental beliefs, but have their own power to account for behavioural intentions”. 
At the same time, they are also socially constructed, in as much as their “reality” is 
mediated by social knowledge and dominant socio-political context of a given society 
(Spangenberg, 2005; Beck, 2010).
Since we review national averages, this does not let us determine conclusively whether 
or not the value orientations we choose to emphasise might primarily be found among 
the affl  uent within the national units (Ančić and Domazet, 2015). However, taken to-
gether, the results above indicate that the traits we expected to characterise respondents 
who are receptive to growth-critical environmentalism do not correlate with diff erences 
in national affl  uence. Th ese kinds of subjectivities, which we may tentatively call “pa-
ssive degrowthers” – concerned with environmental limits but not presently engaged 
in environmental activism – represent approximately 20-40% of national populations 
across European countries, regardless of national average affl  uence, development attain-
ment, GHG emissions or ecological footprint (Ančić and Domazet, 2015; Balžekiene 
and Telešiene, 2017; Schaff rin and Schmidt-Catran, 2017). Hence we argue that it is 
a fallacy to expect that only affl  uent societies hold value orientations important for the 
switch to sustainability. Th e European continent is not divided into an affl  uent core and 
a lagging semi-periphery too busy catching up to be concerned with climate change. 
Less affl  uent European societies, where large segments of the society are exposed to risk 
of poverty and various forms of material insecurity, exhibit important features of envi-
ronmentalism not based on consumer choice (Domazet and Ančić, 2017).
Populations in less affl  uent European societies exhibit a higher awareness of the risks 
posed by environmental degradation. What about the other concerns we associate with 
egalitarian environmentalism discussed in section 2? Th at is, concerns with power re-
lations, ecological distributional confl ict, and equity. As a phenomenon, in-equity has 
a measurable importance for environmentalism: regardless of which measure of inequ-
ality we used, it proved corrosive for environmental concern, readiness for material 
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sacrifi ce and, no less important, the preparedness of people to trust each other (Dolenec 
et al., 2014). Such fi ndings corroborate arguments according to which the relationship 
between rise in income and environmental protection is anything but automatic (Gro-
ssman and Krueger, 1995; Knight and Messer, 2012). When economic development is 
not accompanied by a more equitable distribution of power and income within society, 
environmental sustainability is directly jeopardised. Further, more than just presenting 
it as something which is found in contexts of inequality, Martinez-Alier (2002) asso-
ciates “environmentalism of the poor” with direct claims for distributive justice. Th e 
populations of these countries exhibit stronger redistributive preferences, which argu-
ably represent a crucial aspect of a determined societal eff ort for a shared wellbeing 
with lower environmental and climate impact (Dietz et al., 2005; Hansla et al., 2013; 
Dolenec et al., 2014).
To conclude, we must reconsider the received wisdom about where environmentalists 
are to be found. Th e studies we reviewed here suggest that awareness of the environ-
mental limits of growth is not guided by national wealth in the way that self-reported 
readiness to act on it is. Is it then simply in regards to a self-reported willingness to take 
certain actions – in particular, a “willingness to pay” – that the European semi-periphery 
lags behind? We suggest that what matters for sustainability, as understood from a de-
growth perspective, may well be a more equitable distribution of power within society, 
which may or may not occur with economic development and GDP growth. Following 
Torras and Boyce (1998:150), we agree that “distribution of power is not a periphe-
ral concern” – on the contrary, a more equitable income distribution combined with 
stronger political rights and individual emancipation are key factors in garnering public 
support for the reorientation towards environmentally sensible trajectories. Perhaps the 
pan-European environmentalist may not be a “green consumer”, but an egalitarian wi-
lling to challenge a social system based on infi nite economic growth. In the fourth and 
fi nal section, we propose one implication of this.
4. E NVIRONMENTALISM AND JUSTICE
In section 1, we argued that the kind of commitments which are often designated by the 
word “environmentalism” are insuffi  cient for the challenges of our present situation. In 
section 2, we demonstrated how the commitments associated with a more adequate form 
of environmentalism are not correlated with the same social conditions as those which 
defi ne an environmentalist for much conventional research. Instead of affl  uence, “justice” 
and “equity” began to appear as crucial elements for egalitarian environmentalism. In this 
section, we would like to off er a tentative suggestion as to what these two elements might 
imply politically when taken together. Th e basic conundrum is this: Economic growth 
ensures the continuous generation of many such things as people presently fi nd valuable. 
If a politics of equity is to call for something other than equal participation in the process 
of committing ecocide (Tammilehto, 2014), then it needs to articulate a challenge to this 
very regime of valuation. What mode of deliberating upon justice lets this be done?
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A focus on inequality introduces the question of power into the analysis (Dolenec et 
al., 2014), and the need to clearly state who wins, who loses out, and what defi nes ei-
ther. Th is is a question of justice, and much has been written on that topic in relation 
to climate change (Barker et al., 2008; Preston et al., 2014). As for economic growth, 
which is our more immediate concern here, one very compelling suggestion as to what 
paradigm of distributive justice is appropriate for evaluating the phenomenon of growth 
as such is articulated by philosopher Barbara Muraca. What Muraca (2012) challen-
ges is the established paradigms of “welfarism” (e.g. Layard; rejected for its utilitarian 
assumptions and reliance on self-reported states) and “resourcism” (e.g. Rawls; rejected 
for its concern with good “things” rather than the infl uence of these things on human li-
ves, which may require very diff erent resources in order to function). Th is leaves the “ca-
pabilities-approach”, which Muraca adopts from Sen and Nussbaum (Muraca, 2012). 
As we read it, her argument for the superiority of this paradigm over the others hinges 
on the same characteristic: that “justice” is determined in relation to a certain kind of 
good that a person has reason to value (Muraca, 2012:538). Th is means that, unlike 
what is the case for welfarism, there is a demand for a justifi cation for preferences; and 
unlike resourcism, the allocation of “resources” is evaluated only in light of what is so 
justifi ed. Justice, in this sense, takes its measure from what can be recognised as legiti-
mate in aspirations. Th is, according to Muraca, implies that “a ‘just’ degrowth society, 
in which claims for the good life are constitutive for justice, is only possible if patterns 
of recognition and established values are renegotiated” (Muraca, 2012:543).
To establish what is just in any given situation would thus imply recourse to the values 
which determine what it means to be so, which is in turn negotiated in view of substan-
tive visions of the meaning of “the good life”. Th e content of such visions, of course, is 
also subject to negotiation. Th e signifi cant point is that distributive justice would then 
not be limited to rectifying asymmetries in a way that merely assures more equal access 
to consumer goods. In the opening of such a space of negotiation, furthermore, the con-
cern for “justice” that is immanent to environmental ideologies (of the kind that section 
1 above outlines and section 2 traces self-reported concerns for) may be translated into 
a voluntary social transformation to meet the challenge of climate change.
Th erefore, in such terms, negotiations over justice would measure up to the demands de-
rived from the fi rst section of this paper. As for the popular engagement such negotiations 
may resonate with, we would like to off er an even briefer connection with John Meyer’s 
(2010) discussion on environmentally motivated sacrifi ce among blue collar workers. Th is 
is a group which, like Eastern Europeans, is traditionally seen as reluctant to such sacrifi ce. 
What Meyer notes is that such workers are, in fact, traditionally animated by an ethos of 
sacrifi ce in a way which, however, demands that the sacrifi ce is recognised and reciproca-
ted (Meyer, 2010:24). In the space of negotiation, which questions of justice can create 
if approached in the form advanced in this section, the task of answering the challenge 
of climate change can let us designate diff erentiated rights and duties by way of mutual 
recognition and reciprocity. Th is is quite distinct from moralising exhortations in a society 
characterised by inequality, where those themselves experiencing having less of that which 
Soc. ekol. Zagreb, Vol. 25 (2016.), No. 1-2
O. Krűger, M. Domazet and D. Dolenec: Rejecting the Post-Political Response to Climate Change: ...
182
is socially recognised as desirable are implored to sacrifi ce their pursuit of that which they 
lack. If popular commitment to such “sacrifi ce” is necessary for a democratic response to 
climate change to take place, then our search for a way out of our present predicament will 
be egalitarian and democratic, or it will not work – these are not mere normative ends, but 
the means to achieve a switch to sustainability.
In a nutshell, the concentration of power and growing income inequalities pose funda-
mental obstacles to achieving sustainable human development. When material conditi-
ons of life and resulting life chances become as vastly disparate as they are today, people 
lack a basic sense of shared humanity without which we cannot engage in a democratic 
debate on the features of a just society (Wright, 2011). Th erefore, reducing inequa-
lity and ensuring basic human security are necessary ingredients in the reorientation 
towards sustainability. In addition to that, we must not lose focus of the fact that, while 
sustainable or unsustainable practices are a matter of choice, “for too many people on 
Earth the problem is not unsustainable choices, but a lack of choice in the fi rst place” 
(Dolenec et al., 2014). In this context, abandoning those activities that contribute to 
the present climate change may no longer be experienced as self-abnegating, as much as 
affi  rmative of a joyful participation in an extended human community. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Th is paper draws together theoretical, empirical and political concerns, couched in ten-
tative language such as “perhaps” and “suggest”. Both are symptomatic of what we hope 
to achieve, which is to raise an opening for enquiry. Th e opening we hope to create is 
crucial to our ability to fi nd a new way through the predicament of climate change. Pre-
sent responses to this change are inadequate, and our discussion indicates ways in which 
resistance to appropriate measures may be products of something at the very foundati-
ons of our dominant socio-political context, rather than in quirks that can be repaired. 
Th us, our discussion is intended to advance a critique of environmentalism as perceived 
within the dominant capitalist paradigm. In a diff erent kind of social context, the wi-
despread concern with climate change might fi nd ways to be translated into adequate 
action. Our way of advancing such a position is, in this paper, focused on attending to 
some of those who are traditionally perceived as reluctant to answer the demands posed 
by environmental degradation. In section 2 we argued that the actions these populati-
ons might really be reluctant towards are, in fact, themselves inadequate. Th ere are other 
ways of conceiving meaningful environmental action, which would proceed along other 
lines. In section 3 we interrogated whether or not the data that confi rms the absence of 
conventionally defi ned “environmentalists” in the European semi-periphery might not 
also show the contours of that which we associate with the alternative, preferable, form 
of egalitarian environmentalism. Under our new scrutiny, the distribution of European 
environmentalism was shown to look very diff erent than received wisdom expects it to: 
“Environmentalist” value orientations were shown to be as prevalent (or more) in the 
European semi-periphery as they are in its core.
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Our demonstration has implications for widespread notions of the condition for envi-
ronmentalism, which is often taken to be that of affl  uence. While affl  uence may hold 
the key to various forms of green consumerism, it does not do so for environmental 
threats perception, risks, and values related to global development strategies (cf. Haller 
and Hadler, 2008). Such concern may, in fact, be more conducive for what we propose 
in section 1 to be a more appropriate form of environmentalism. Th is form of egali-
tarian environmentalism would not treat “the environment” as an isolated issue, but 
integrate it within a programme of social transformation. In section 4 we proposed the 
outlines of a kind of social deliberation that may resonate with the sensibilities we trace 
in the preceding sections. Within such a venue, we believe, there are ways of formula-
ting answers to climate change that are both adequate and generated through a process 
built on broad consent. Th us, the opening we seek to pry in the debate on the features 
of environmentalism may, quite possibly, let us uncover a way for Europe to respond to 
climate change – and to do so in a way that is not abnegating but, ultimately, liberating. 
REFERENCES
Ančić, B., and Domazet, M. (2015). Potential for Degrowth: Attitudes and Behaviours 
across 18 European Countries. Teorija in Praksa, 52(3): 456-475.
Ančić, B., Puđak, J., Domazet, M. (2016). Vidimo li klimatske promjene u Hrvats-
koj? Istraživanje stavova o nekim od aspekata klimatskih promjena u hrvatskom 
društvu. Hrvatski meteorološki časopis, 51: 27-45. 
Anguelovski, I. (2015). Environmental justice. In: D’Alisa, G., Demaria, F., Kallis, G. 
(eds.), Degrowth: A vocabulary for a new era (pp. 33-36). Abingdon: Routledge. 
Auger, P. and Devinney, T. M. (2007). Do What Consumers Say Matter? Th e Misalign-
ment of Preferences with Unconstrained Ethical Intentions. Journal of Business Eth-
ics 76(4): 361-383.
Balžekiene, A. and Telešiene, A. (2017). Vulnerable and insecure? Environmental and 
technological risk perception in Europe. In: Telešienė, A. and Gross, M. (eds.), 
Green European. Environmental Behaviour and Attitudes in Europe in a Historical 
and Cross-Cultural Comparative Perspective (pp. 31-55). Abingdon: Routledge.
Barker, T., Scrieciu, S., Taylor, D. (2008). Climate change, social justice and develop-
ment. Development, 51(3): 317-324.
Beck, U. (2010). Climate for change, or how to create a green modernity? Th eory, Cul-
ture & Society, 27(2-3): 254-266.
Bithas, K., and Kalimeris, P. (2013). Re-estimating the decoupling eff ect: Is there an 
actual transition towards a less energy-intensive economy? Energy, 51: 78-84.
Boehmer-Christiansen, S. (2003). Science, Equity and the War against Carbon. Science, 
Technology & Human Values, 28: 69-72. 
Brajdić Vuković, M. (2014). Th e sustainability potential of the knowledge society: Em-
pirical study. In: Domazet, M. and Marinović Jerolimov, D. (eds.), Sustainability 
Soc. ekol. Zagreb, Vol. 25 (2016.), No. 1-2
O. Krűger, M. Domazet and D. Dolenec: Rejecting the Post-Political Response to Climate Change: ...
184
Perspectives from the European Semi-periphery (pp. 195-222). Zagreb: Institut za 
društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu and Heinrich Böll Stiftung-Hrvatska.
Brechin, S. R. (1999). Objective problems, subjective values, and global environmental-
ism: Evaluating the postmaterialist argument and challenging a new explanation. 
Social Science Quarterly, 80(4): 793-809.
Carrington, M. J., Zwick, D., Neville, B. (2016). Th e ideology of the ethical consump-
tion gap. Marketing Th eory, 16(1): 21-38.
Demaria, F., Schneider, F., Sekulova, F., Martinez-Alier, J. (2013). What is degrowth? 
From an activist slogan to a social movement. Environmental Values, 22(2): 191-215.
Diekmann, A., and Franzen, A. (1999). Th e wealth of nations and environmental con-
cern. Environment and behavior, 31(4): 540-549.
Dietz, T., Fitzgerald, A., Shwom, R. (2005). Environmental Values. Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources 30: 335-372. 
Dolenec, D., Domazet, M., Ančić, B. (2014). Why power is not a peripheral concern: 
Exploring the relationship between inequality and sustainability. In: Domazet, M. 
and Marinović Jerolimov, D. (eds.), Sustainability Perspectives from the European 
Semi-periphery (pp. 173-194). Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu 
and Heinrich Böll Stiftung-Hrvatska
Domazet, M., Ančić, B., Brajdić Vuković, M. (2014). Prosperity and environmental 
sacrifi ce in Europe: Importance of income for sustainability-orientation. In: Do-
mazet, M. and Marinović Jerolimov, D. (eds.), Sustainability Perspectives from the 
European Semi-periphery (pp. 145-172). Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja u 
Zagrebu and Heinrich Bőll Stiftung-Hrvatska. 
Domazet, M., and Marinović Jerolimov, D. (2014). Sustainability on the semi-periph-
ery: an impossible topic in a non-existent place? In: Domazet, M. and Marinović 
Jerolimov, D. (eds.), Sustainability Perspectives from the European Semi-periphery 
(pp. 19-49). Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu and Heinrich Bőll 
Stiftung-Hrvatska.
Domazet, M. and Ančić, B. (2017). How far for the money? Affl  uence and democratic 
degrowth potential in Europe. In: Telešienė, A. and Gross, M. (eds.), Green Euro-
pean. Environmental Behaviour and Attitudes in Europe in a Historical and Cross-
Cultural Comparative Perspective (pp. 157-181). Abingdon: Routledge.
Dunlap, R. E. (2017). Foreword: A brief history of sociological research on environ-
mental concern. In: Telešienė, A. and Gross, M. (eds.), Green European. Environ-
mental Behaviour and Attitudes in Europe in a Historical and Cross-Cultural Com-
parative Perspective (pp. 19-26). Abingdon: Routledge.
Dunlap, R. E. and York, R. (2008). Th e Globalization of Environmental Concern and 
the Limits of the Post-Materialist Explanation: Evidence from Four Cross-National 
Surveys. Sociological Quarterly, 49: 529-563.
Dunlap, R. E., and McCright, A. M. (2011). Organized climate change denial. In: 
Honig, A. P. B., and Dryzek, J. (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Th eory (pp. 144-
160). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Soc. ekol. Zagreb, Vol. 25 (2016.), No. 1-2
O. Krűger, M. Domazet and D. Dolenec: Rejecting the Post-Political Response to Climate Change: ...
185
EJatlas. (2016). Environmental Justice Atlas. URL: http://ejatlas.org/ (July 14, 2016).
European Commission (2008). Europeans’ attitudes towards climate change. Special 
Eurobarometer 322.
European Commission (2014). Climate change. Special Eurobarometer 409.
European Commission, Joint Research Centre (EC JRC) / Netherlands Environmen-
tal Assessment Agency (PBL). (2014). Emission Database for Global Atmospheric 
Research (EDGAR), release CO2 time series 1970-2013. URL: http://edgar.jrc.
ec.europa.eu. (June, 2015). 
Fairbrother, M. (2012). Rich People, Poor People, and Environmental Concern: Evi-
dence across Nations and Time. European Sociological Review, 29: 910-922. 
Franzen, A. (2003). Environmental attitudes in international comparison: An analysis 
of the ISSP surveys 1993 and 2000. Social Science Quarterly, 84(2): 297-308. 
Franzen, A., and Meyer, R. (2010). Environmental attitudes in cross-national perspecti-
ve: A multilevel analysis of the ISSP 1993 and 2000. European Sociological Review, 
26(2): 219-234.
Franzen, A. and Vogl, D. (2012). Acquiescence and the Willingness to Pay for Envi-
ronmental Protection: A Comparison of the ISSP, WVS, and EVS. Social Science 
Quarterly, 93(3): 637-659. 
Franzen, A. and Vogl, D. (2013). Two decades of measuring environmental attitudes: A 
comparative analysis of 33 countries. Global Environmental Change, 23(5): 1001-1008. 
Gelissen, J. (2007). Explaining popular support for environmental protection – A mul-
tilevel analysis of 50 nations. Environment and Behavior, 39(3): 392-415. 
Grossman, G. M., and Krueger, A. B. (1995). Economic Growth and the Environment. 
Th e Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(2): 353-377.
Haanpää, L. (2006). Environmental Concern Worldwide: An Examination of Two-
Way Th esis of Environmentalism and National Variation. In: Wilska, T. A. and 
Haanpää, L. (eds.), Lifestyles and Social Change. Essays in Economic Sociology (pp. 
179-204). Tampere: Esa.
Haller, M. and Hadler, M. (2008). Dispositions to Act in favour of the Environment: 
Fatalism and Readiness to Make Sacrifi ces in Cross National Perspective. Sociologi-
cal Forum 23(2): 281-311. 
Hansla, A., Gaerling, T., Biel. A. (2013). Attitude toward environmental policy measures 
related to value orientation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 43(3): 582-590. 
Helm, C. and Simonis, U. E. (2001). Distributive Justice in International Environ-
mental Policy: Axiomatic Foundation and Exemplary Formulation. Environmental 
Values, 10(1): 5-18. 
Hirsch, F. (2005). Social limits to growth (e-book edition). London: Routledge.
Inglehart, R. and Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the persi-
stence of traditional values. American Sociological Review, 65(1): 19-51. 
ISSP Research Group (2012). International social survey programme: Environment 
III – ISSP 2010. Cologne: Gesis Data Archive. ZA5500 Data fi le version 2.0.0, 
doi:10.4232/1.11418
Soc. ekol. Zagreb, Vol. 25 (2016.), No. 1-2
O. Krűger, M. Domazet and D. Dolenec: Rejecting the Post-Political Response to Climate Change: ...
186
Kalimeris, P., Richardson, C., Bithas, K. (2014). A meta-analysis investigation of the 
direction of the energy-GDP causal relationship: implications for the growth-de-
growth dialogue. Journal of Cleaner Production, 67: 1-13.
Kallis, G., Demaria, F., D’Alisa, G. (2015). Introduction: degrowth. In: D’Alisa, G., 
Demaria, F., Kallis, G. (eds.), Degrowth: A vocabulary for a new era (pp. 1-18). 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Kemmelmeier, M., Krol, G., Kim, Y. H. (2002). Values, economics, and proenviron-
mental attitudes in 22 societies. Cross-Cultural Research, 36(3): 256-285.
Knight, K. W. and Messer, B. L. (2012). Environmental Concern in Cross-National 
Perspective: Th e Eff ects of Affl  uence, Environmental Degradation, and World So-
ciety. Social Science Quarterly, 93(2): 521-537. 
Kothari, A., Demaria, F., Acosta, A. (2014). Buen Vivir, Degrowth and Ecological Swa-
raj: Alternatives to sustainable development and the Green Economy. Development, 
57(3-4): 362-375.
Marquart-Pyatt, S. T. (2008). Are there similar sources of environmental concern? 
Comparing industrialized countries. Social Science Quarterly, 89(5): 1312-1335. 
Marquart-Pyatt, S. T. (2012a). Environmental Concerns in Cross-National Context: 
How Do Mass Publics in Central and Eastern Europe Compare with Other Regi-
ons of the World? Czech Sociological Review, 48(3): 441- 466.
Marquart-Pyatt, S. T. (2012b). Contextual Infl uences on Envrionmental Concerns Cro-
ss-Nationally: A multilevel Investigation. Social Science Research, 41(5): 1085-1099. 
Martinez-Alier, J. (2002). Th e environmentalism of the poor: a study of ecological confl icts 
and valuation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Martinez-Alier, J. (2015). Environmentalism, currents of. In: G. D’Alisa, G., Demaria, 
F., Kallis, G. (eds.), Degrowth: A vocabulary for a new era (pp. 37-40). Abingdon: 
Routledge.
Meyer, J. M. (2010). A democratic politics of sacrifi ce? In: Maniates, M. and Meyer, J. 
M. (eds.), Th e environmental politics of sacrifi ce (pp. 13-32). Cambridge, MA: Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Meyer, R., and Liebe, U. (2010). Are the affl  uent prepared to pay for the planet? Expla-
ining willingness to pay for public and quasi-private environmental goods in Swit-
zerland. Population and Environment, 32(1): 42-65.
Milanovic, B. (2011). Worlds apart: Measuring international and global inequality. Prin-
ceton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mol, A. and Spaargaren, G. (2000). Ecological modernization theory in debate: a re-
view. Environmental Politics, 9(1): 17-49. 
Muraca, B. (2012). Towards a fair degrowth-society: Justice and the right to a ‘good life’ 
beyond growth. Futures, 44(6): 535-545.
Muraca, B. (2013). Décroissance: A project for a radical transformation of society. En-
vironmental Values, 22(2): 147-169.
Nawrotzki, R. J. (2012). Th e Politics of Environmental Concern: A Cross-National 
Analysis. Organization & Environment, 25(3): 286-307.
Soc. ekol. Zagreb, Vol. 25 (2016.), No. 1-2
O. Krűger, M. Domazet and D. Dolenec: Rejecting the Post-Political Response to Climate Change: ...
187
O’Connor, R. E., Bord, R. J., Fisher, A. (1999). Risk perceptions, general environmen-
tal beliefs, and willingness to address climate change. Risk analysis, 19(3): 461-471.
Preston, I., Banks, N., Hargreaves, K., Kazmierczak, A., Lucas, K., Mayne, R., Downing, 
C., Street, R. (2014). Climate change and social justice: an evidence review. York: Jo-
seph Rowntree.
Princen, T. (2010). Consumer Sovereignty, Heroic Sacrifi ce: Two Insidious Concepts in 
an Endlessly Expansionist Economy. In: Maniates, M. and Meyer. J. W. (eds.), Th e 
Environmental Politics of Sacrifi ce (pp. 145-164). Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press.
Sandel, M. (2012). What Money Can’t Buy: Th e Moral Limits of Markets. New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Schaff artzik, A., Mayer, A., Gingrich, S., Eisenmenger, N., Loy, C., Krausmann, F. 
(2014). Th e global metabolic transition: regional patterns and trends of global ma-
terial fl ows, 1950-2010. Global Environmental Change, 26: 87-97. 
Schaff rin, A. and Schmidt-Catran, A. (2017). Changing Concern about Environmental 
Th reats and Risks – A Longitudinal and Multilevel Perspective on the Relations-
hip Between Values and Interests. In: In: Telešienė, A. and Gross, M. (eds.), Green 
European. Environmental Behaviour and Attitudes in Europe in a Historical and Cro-
ss-Cultural Comparative Perspective (pp. 56-88). Abingdon: Routledge.
Simms, A., Johnson, V., Chowla, P., Murphy, M. (2010). Growth isn’t possible: Why we need 
a new economic direction. Lon don: New Economics Foundation and Schumacher College.
Skidelsky, R. and Skidelsky, E. (2012). How much is enough? Money and the good life. 
London: Penguin Books.
Spangenberg, J. H. (2005). Will the information society be sustainable? Towards cri-
teria and indicators for a sustainable knowledge society. International Journal of 
Innovation and Sustainable Development, 1(1-2), 85-102.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2013). Th e Price of Inequality. London: Penguin Books.
Swyngedouw, E. (2010). Apocalypse forever? Post-political populism and the spectre of 
climate change. Th eory, Culture & Society, 27(2-3): 213-232.
Swyngedouw, E. (2014). Depoliticization (‘Th e Political’). In: G. D’Alisa, G., Demaria, 
F., Kallis, G. (eds.), Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era, (pp. 90-93). London: 
Routledge.
Szerszynski, B. (2010). Reading and writing the weather climate technics and the mo-
ment of responsibility. Th eory, Culture & Society, 27(2-3): 9-30.
Tammilehto, O. (2014). Rewarding with a licence to commit ecocide: High incomes 
and climate change. Degrowth Conference Leipzig. URL: http://www.degrowth.
de/en/catalogue-entry/rewarding-with-a-licence-to-commit-ecocide-high-inco-
mes-and-climate-change/ (June, 2015). 
Temper, L. 2015. Mapping the global battle to protect our planet. Th e Guardian onli-
ne. URL: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network 
/2015/mar/03/mapping-environmental-protest-justice-defending-land (May 18, 
2016).
Soc. ekol. Zagreb, Vol. 25 (2016.), No. 1-2
O. Krűger, M. Domazet and D. Dolenec: Rejecting the Post-Political Response to Climate Change: ...
188
Timmons Roberts, J. and Parks, B. C. (2010). A “shared vision”? Why inequality sho-
uld worry us. In: O’Brien, K., Lera St.Clari, A., Kristoff ersen, B. (eds.), Climate 
Change, Ethics and Human Security (pp. 65-82). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Torras, M., and Boyce, J. K. (1998). Income, inequality, and pollution: a reassessment 
of the environmental Kuznets curve. Ecological economics, 25(2): 147-160.
United Nations Climate Change Secretariat. (2015). Climate Action Now: Summary for 
Policymakers 2015. Bonn: United Nations Climate Change Secretariat.
Urry, J. (2011). Climate change and society. London: Polity.
Wapner, P. (2010). Sacrifi ce in an Age of Comfort. In: Maniates, M. and Meyer, J. W. 
(eds.), Th e Environmental Politics of Sacrifi ce (pp. 33-60). Cambridge, MA: Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Wilkinson, R., and Pickett, K. (2010). Th e spirit level: why equality is better for everyone. 
London: Penguin Books.
Wright, E. O. (2011). Vizije realističnih utopija. Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti.
Soc. ekol. Zagreb, Vol. 25 (2016.), No. 1-2
O. Krűger, M. Domazet and D. Dolenec: Rejecting the Post-Political Response to Climate Change: ...
189
PROTIV POST-POLITIČKOG ODGOVORA NA KLIMATSKE 
PROMJENE: PREDSTAVLJANJE EGALITARNOG EUROPSKOG 
OKOLIŠTARCA
Oscar Krüger, Mladen Domazet i Danijela Dolenec
Sažetak 
Pitanje klimatskih promjena zahtjeva odgovor a oni koji tvrde da su predani oblikovanju tog odgovora 
nazivaju se okolištarcima. U društvenim istraživanjima, mnogo je napora uloženo u traganje za tim 
takozvanim okolištarcima, pri čemu se pokušalo razumjeti zašto ih na nekim geografskim i socijalnim 
prostorima pronalazimo a na drugima ne. Jedno od vodećih mišljenja u sociologiji okoliša jest da pokret za 
zaštitu okoliša proizlazi iz privilegiranog položaja imućnih članova društva. 
U ovom radu iznosimo trostruku provokaciju – konceptualnu, empirijsku i političku – s ciljem da buduća 
istraživanja na ovu temu okrenemo u drugačijem smjeru. Konceptualno, inzistiramo na potrebi razliko-
vanja post-političkog od političkog pokreta za zaštitu okoliša, za što dajemo primjer društvenog pokreta za 
„smanjenje rasta” (engl. degrowth). Empirijski, pokazujemo da se istraživanja koja pokret za zaštitu okoliša 
prikazuju kao pokret imućnih oslanjaju na post-političku defi niciju okolištaraca. Nadalje pokazujemo da 
ako vrijednosne orijentacije o okolišu povežemo sa smanjenjem rasta, dobivamo mnogo drugačiju kartu 
pokreta za zaštitu okoliša u Europi. Politički, ovo je izazov postojećim shvaćanjima onoga što je realistično 
u politici za naš europski kontinent ali i izvan njega. 
Ključne riječi: klimatske promjene, pokret za zaštitu okoliša, semi-periferija, pravda, smanjenje rasta
GEGEN EINE POSTPOLITISCHE ANTWORT AUF DEN 
KLIMAWANDEL: VORSTELLEN DES EGALITÄREN EUROPÄISCHEN 
UMWELTSCHÜTZERS
Oscar Krüger, Mladen Domazet und Danijela Dolenec
Zusammenfassung
Die Frage des Klimawandels bedarf einer Antwort und diejenigen, die behaupten, sich dieser Antwort 
zu widmen, nennt man Umweltschützer. Im Rahmen der Sozialforschung hat man sich viel Mühe gege-
ben, die sogenannten Umweltschützer zu fi nden, wobei man zu verstehen versuchte, warum man sie in 
manchen geografi schen und sozialen Räumen fi nden kann und in anderen nicht. Eine der am meisten 
vertretenen Meinungen in der Umweltsoziologie ist, dass die Umweltschutzbewegung auf der privilegierten 
Stellung wohlhabender Gesellschaftsmitglieder beruht. 
In dieser Arbeit liefern wir eine dreifache Provokation – im konzeptuellen, empirischen und politischen Sinne 
– mit dem Ziel, die zukünftige Forschung zu diesem Th ema in eine andere Richtung zu wenden. Konzepti-
onell bestehen wir darauf, dass zwischen postpolitischer und politischer Umweltschutzbewegung unterschie-
den wird, wofür wir ein Beispiel geben, nämlich die soziale Bewegung für „Wachstumsrücknahme ” (engl. 
degrowth). Empirisch zeigen wir, dass die Forschung, die Umweltschutzbewegung als eine Bewegung der 
Wohlhabenden darstellt, auf der postpolitischen Defi nition der Umweltschützer beruht. Weiterhin zeigen wir, 
dass eine viel unterschiedlichere Karte der Umweltschutzbewegung in Europa entsteht, wenn wir die Werto-
rientierung zur Umwelt mit einer Wachstumsrücknahme verbinden. Politisch ist das eine Herausforderung 
an die herkömmliche Meinung dazu, was in der Politik realistisch für das europäische Kontinet und darüber 
hinaus ist. Wir schließen mit einem kurzen Vorschlag: 
Schlüsselwörter: Klimawandel, Umweltschutzbewegung, Halbperipherie, Gerechtigkeit, Wachstumsrück-
nahme
